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Deferred Taxation and E¤ective Tax Rates
on Income from Capital in the United
States, 2000-2010
Vito Politoy
Abstract
The accounting and economic literature have long highlighted the potential
implications of deferred taxation for tax policy analysis. This paper incorpo-
rates deferred taxation into the neoclassical investment model for the compu-
tation of the E¤ective Tax Rate (ETR) on business investment and revisits
the empirical evidence on the evolution of ETRs in the United States over the
last decade. The numerical results show that after including deferred taxation
there is little di¤erential in the ETRs across assets; ETRs in the 2000s have
been essentially in line with statutory rates; and partial expensing had little
e¤ect on ETRs. These results hold whether investment is nanced by equity
or debt; prots are distributed to individual shareholders through dividends,
interests or capital gains; and regardless of the di¤erential between book and
economic depreciation.
Keywords: Deferred taxation, e¤ective marginal tax rates, taxation of in-
come from capital
JEL classication: H3
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade the United States has faced two economic downturns: in the
early 2000s following the bust of the dot-com bubble and after the 2007 nancial cri-
sis. Corporate tax incentives were provided in both cases in order to promote faster
business investment and facilitate the economic recovery for the corporate sector.
Both tax stimuli granted at the beginning and end of the 2000s featured temporary
increases in tax depreciation allowances for capital spending (partial expensing or,
equivalently, bonus depreciation). The 2002 Job Creation and Worker Assistance
Act allowed 30 per cent partial expensing for qualied capital equipment with an
assumed life of 20 years or less purchased between September 2001 and May 2003.
The allowance was increased to 50 per cent by the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Re-
lief Reconciliation Act, and then repealed by the end of 2004. The 2008 Economic
Stimulus Act reintroduced 50 per cent partial expensing on the cost of depreciable
properties acquired in 2008. Subsequently, Section 1201 of the 2009 American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act extended the additional 50 per cent rst-year depreciation
deduction for a further year to assets acquired in 2009.
Neoclassical economic theory states that partial expensing or, more generally,
accelerated depreciation increases the rate of investment because, by deferring tax
payments to the future, it increases the present value of dividend income distributable
to shareholders thus reducing the e¤ective tax burden on income from capital. The
empirical literature has also indicated that changes in the e¤ective tax burden on
business investment can have signicant impacts on investment activity, see Hassett
and Hubbard (2002) and, for a review, De Mooij and Ederveen (2003).
In practice, however, high tax depreciation aims to provide rms with extra cash
for investment, rather than increase dividend pay-outs. For this reason Generally
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Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the United States, hereafter US GAAP,
impose nancial constraints on dividend policy to prevent rms from distributing to
shareholders any cash-ow arising from the tax deferral generated by tax deprecia-
tion. In turn, this implies that the benet of tax depreciation on investment choices
can be signicantly overstated by the standard analysis.
The relevance of deferred taxation for corporations in the United States has been
long recognized in the empirical accounting literature, which has demonstrated that
deferred taxation is the main determinant of the growing gap between the tax and
book value of corporation earnings, see Hanlon and Shevlin (2005), and that the
gap between book and tax depreciation of business assets is the main source of de-
ferred taxation, see Poterba, Rao, and Seidman (2011). Parallel developments in the
economic literature, for example King (1974), Boadway and Bruce (1979) and Kanni-
ainen and Södersten (1995), have demonstrated the relevance of deferred taxation for
investment choices and tax policy analysis: a tax policy that introduces accelerated
depreciation can indeed decrease current tax liabilities but it also increases deferred
tax expenses, thus leaving the total tax liability unchanged. Consequently, tax policy
analyses that do not consider simultaneously tax depreciation and deferred taxation
can be potentially misleading, see Sørensen (1995).
This paper therefore develops an extension of the standard model for the com-
putation of the E¤ective Tax Rate (ETR) pioneered by King and Fullerton (1984)
and further developed by Gravelle (1994), to incorporate the e¤ect of the deferred
tax constraint. The economic literature on deferred taxation and investment choices
cited above typically assumes deferred taxation to stem from the gap between eco-
nomic and tax depreciation. The model developed in this paper, instead, allows the
deferred tax constraint to be determined by the gap between the value of business
assets for tax and book purposes, thus providing a theoretical assessment of deferred
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taxation consistent with the US GAAP.
The ETRs derived from the constrained version of the model are then compared
with those obtained from the standard theory. It emerges that after considering
deferred taxation, ETRs on domestic investment nanced by equity and debt show
little response to changes in tax depreciation regimes, while they are far more af-
fected by variations in statutory tax rates. Consequently, tax depreciation has also
little impact on tax rate di¤erentials across asset types. Furthermore, the deferred
tax constraint is demonstrated to be always binding unless book depreciation fully
reects tax depreciation: the ETR is higher (lower) than the statutory rate if book
depreciation is lower (higher) than economic depreciation.
Using the dataset employed in the 2006 work of the Congressional Budget O¢ ce,
hereafter CBO (2006), the paper computes ETRs time series on domestic investment
in the United States over the period 2000-2010, starting with a benchmark speci-
cation which assumes that the deferred tax constraint depends on the gap between
economic and tax depreciation, as postulated by Kanniainen and Södersten (1995).
The empirical results show that the current assessment largely understates the
e¤ective tax burden faced by corporations in the United States over the last decade:
when considering taxation at the corporate level alone, the constrained model shows
that over the last decade the ETR has been on average 35 per cent on investment
nanced by equity and -21 per cent on investment nanced by debt, whereas the
standard theory predicts 26 and -38 per cent respectively. This result emerges because
the standard assessment considerably overstates the benet of partial expensing. For
example, after accounting for deferred taxation, the 50 per cent partial expensing
granted in 2004 and in 2008-2009 reduced the ETR on investment nanced by equity
only by about 0.3 per cent, while the standard theory predicts a reduction of about 6
per cent. The average 2000-2010 tax rate di¤erential across asset types is negligible
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under the constrained model, while being about 9 per cent under the standard model.
These results hold even when taxation at the individual level is considered: the
constrained ETR has been on average over the last ten year close to 40 per cent
(the combined statutory rate at corporate-individual tax rate) under equity nance
and zero under debt nance, while the standard theory predicts 31 and - 15 per cent
respectively.
The paper nally carries out a robustness check of these ndings by allowing
the deferred tax constraint to depend on the gap between book and tax deprecia-
tion. Since there is no information on depreciation rates and methods for nancial
reporting purposes of the assets used by CBO (2006), the impact of the deferred
tax constraint under US GAAP is assessed though a systematic sensitivity analysis:
the depreciation method for book purposes of each asset is assumed to be the same
as for economic depreciation, while rates of book depreciation are drawn randomly
from a uniform distribution. The experiment is repeated for a large number of draws
and the ETR computed at each step are then used to determine condence bands
around the benchmark measures of the ETR: it emerges that the di¤erence between
the measure of the ETR with and without the deferred tax constraint are statisti-
cally signicant since the ETR from the unconstrained model never falls within the
tunnel constructed using the 90 percent predictive bands. This holds regardless of
the form of investment nance and whether or not taxation at the individual level is
considered in the benchmark specication.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes how corporations in the United
States account for deferred taxation and summarises the contribution of the ac-
counting and economic literature in explaining the potential implications of deferred
taxation for corporate tax policy analysis. Second 3 provides a non-technical deriva-
tion of the marginal ETR under the deferred tax constraint consistent with the US
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GAAP. Section 4 compares the new measure of the ETR with those obtained from the
standard literature and points out its implications for corporate tax policy analysis.
Section 5 quanties the di¤erences between the constrained and unconstrained mea-
sure of the ETRs under the benchmark assumption that the deferred tax constraint
depends on the gap between economic and tax depreciation. Section 6 discusses how
the interplay between book, tax and economic depreciation a¤ects the ETR and ex-
tends the empirical analysis allowing the deferred tax constraint to depend on the
gap between book and tax depreciation, as prescribed by US GAAP. Section 7 con-
cludes summarising the main ndings of this work. More details on how corporations
earnings are accounted for under US GAAP and the analytical model are provided
in Appendices 1 and 2 respectively.
2 The deferred tax constraint on dividend policy
Book accounting di¤ers from tax accounting in the United States, as in most of OECD
countries, because of the divergence between the purposes of GAAP for nancial
reporting and those for Internal Revenue Service tax forms. This gives rise to a gap
between the value of assets and liabilities for book and tax purposes. The gap results
from either permanent or temporary di¤erences. As documented by Poterba, Rao,
and Seidman (2011), permanent di¤erences, which stem from items of revenue and
cost disallowed for either tax or nancial reporting purposes, are generally a small
component of the overall book-tax gap, which is instead mainly driven by temporary
di¤erences generated by the intertemporal mismatch between the carrying amount
of assets and liabilities for tax and nancial accounting.
Deferred taxes are calculated as the product between the tax rate and the change
of temporary di¤erences between two subsequent tax years, and under US GAAP
corporations must charge them on their income statements. Positive temporary dif-
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ferences generate deferred tax liabilities, i.e. taxes to be paid in the future, which
increase the total tax liability of a corporation; negative temporary di¤erences gen-
erate deferred tax assets, i.e. credits against current taxes, thus reducing the total
tax liability of a corporation. In addition, US GAAP require the recognition in the
balance sheet of any deferred tax asset and liability to reect temporary di¤erences
between book and tax income: indeed, under the SFAS No.109, deferred tax pro-
visions are measured as the corporate tax rate on the di¤erence between the book
and tax basis of assets and liabilities. This is known as the temporary di¤erence
approach. The basic principles of accounting for deferred taxes under the temporary
di¤erence approach are illustrated with a numerical example in Appendix 1.
The theoretical implications of deferred taxation for corporations in the United
States have been extensively scrutinized in the accounting literature. Sansing (1998)
and Guenther and Sansing (2000) demonstrated that deferred taxes are bound to
have real e¤ects on corporations whether or not they revert over time since they are
directly charged against corporate earnings in the income statement. Mills (2006)
highlights the importance of recognizing the signicance of the book-tax gap and
points out several implications of deferred taxation for corporate policy: for example,
corporations with large deferred tax assets are likely to lobby against a tax cut,
whereas corporations with net deferred tax liabilities positions are likely to lobby
for tax rate cuts. Also, the empirical accounting literature has demonstrated that
in the United States the aggregate deferred tax balance for the corporate sector is a
liability. This has increased over time, reaching about $400 billion by the end of 2004
and its main driver has been the di¤erence between book and tax depreciation (see
Mills and Plesko (2003), Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) and Poterba, Rao, and Seidman
(2011)).
The economic e¤ects of deferred taxation on investment choices and corporate
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tax policy analysis were rst outlined in the seminal work on the cost of capital by
King (1974). King explains that company law imposes a binding dividend constraint
on corporations, designed to comply with the fundamental principle that the share
of capital in the economy must be maintained. Early works in the economic litera-
ture produced numerous formulations of the deferred tax constraint: King suggested
that dividends should be modelled as being limited to current prots plus economic
depreciation but net of taxes and interest payments. Boadway and Bruce (1979) and
Boadway (1980) proposed that dividends should not exceed the after tax prot, as
evaluated for either nancial reporting or economic purposes. Sinn (1987) assumes
dividend income to be constrained by the after-tax current prot, net of (accelerated)
depreciation. Kanniainen and Södersten (1995) demonstrated that the actual form
of the deferred tax constraint is ultimately dened by the nancial reporting con-
vention to which a corporation must adhere. They pointed out that the constraint
required in the United States - as in Sinns (1997) formulation - imposes that div-
idends should not exceed the after-tax economic prot, reduced by the tax savings
resulting from accelerated depreciation. To the extent that book depreciation equals
economic depreciation, the formulation of the deferred tax constraint proposed by
Kanniainen and Södersten (1995) is therefore consistent with the temporary di¤er-
ences approach currently required by the US GAAP. The deferred tax constraint,
however, creates liquidity in the rm as it increases cash holdings. In Kanniainen
and Södersten (1995) model the extra liquidity cannot be distributed to shareholders
because of the deferred tax constraint and it cannot be invested in physical capi-
tal since it arises at the margin after the optimal capital stock has been reached.
Polito (2009) employs Kanniainen and Söderstens (1995) version of the deferred tax
constraint to compute ETRs on domestic investment nanced by retained earnings
implied by the 2008 tax codes of ve European countries. The empirical results show
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that omission of the constraint can result in a signicant understatement of the tax
burden faced by corporations. In addition, Polito (2009) observes that if a rm does
not have an investment project, it can keep its cash holdings in a bank account or
purchase nancial assets thus earning interest on it. Reinvestment however can only
partly mitigate the e¤ect of the deferred tax constraint on dividend policy, since only
a small fraction (the after-tax interest rate) of the tax saving generated by accel-
erated depreciation - rather than the whole tax saving - can still be distributed to
shareholders.
3 ETR with deferred taxation
The analytical model used in this paper to calculate ETRs is derived by incorporat-
ing deferred taxation into the framework for the computation of marginal ETRs on
income from capital pioneered by King and Fullerton (1984) and further developed
in the work of Gravelle (1994). In particular, this paper employs the specication of
the standard model recently proposed by Burnham and Ozanne (2006), which has
been fully endorsed by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce in the latest calculation of
marginal ETRs on income from capital in the United States, see CBO (2006).1
The ETR is dened as the ratio between taxes levied on a hypothetical investment
project earning the marginal rate of return and the pre-tax rate return earned by
the same project. In a neoclassical investment model, the pre-tax rate of return on
the marginal unit of investment corresponds to the user cost of capital, as derived
in Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967). The ETR is widely employed
for corporate tax policy analysis since it summarizes in a single measure the overall
impact on income from capital of statutory tax rates and rules for the determination
of the tax base. Traditionally, the latter is captured by the impact of tax depreciation
1This section provides a non-technical derivation of the ETR. More details on the analytical
model are in Appendix 2.
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allowances for capital spending on the return of income from capital. In particular,
according to the standard theory, the e¤ective tax burden falls when the tax code
grants higher tax depreciation. The incentive works because rms can then defer part
of their tax liability to the future, in turn increasing the present value of dividend
income distributable to shareholders or, equivalently, reducing the present value of
taxes levied on income from capital. Vice-versa, a reduction of tax depreciation
allowances has the opposite e¤ect of increasing the ETR. However, as already noted
above, US GAAP require the recognition in the income statement of deferred taxes to
reect the temporary di¤erence in tax and book income generated by the gap between
tax and book depreciation, thus preventing rms from distributing to shareholders
any saving generated by deferred taxation.
To illustrate the derivation of the user cost of capital under US GAAP, consider
the example of a competitive rm that increases its capital stock by purchasing a mar-
ginal unit of capital in period t. This investment generates a gross rate return + ,
where  is the net marginal product of physical capital and  is the rate of economic
depreciation. In the absence of taxation, equilibrium requires the marginal rate of
return on the investment to match its opportunity cost, i.e. + = r +, with r de-
noting the nominal return on nancial investment and  the ination rate. Corporate
taxation a¤ects this equilibrium condition in two ways. First, the marginal return on
the investment is taxed at the statutory corporate tax rate u. Second, the investment
receives a tax depreciation allowance. Suppose  is the depreciation allowance rate;
then the rm receives a reduction of its tax liability in period t of u, thus implying
that the cost of capital falls to 1  u. In subsequent periods, the rm continues to
receive tax depreciation allowances for the additional investment in period t. Dene
the present value of these allowances to be z, then the cost of capital in net present
value is 1   z. As a result of corporate income taxation, the marginal condition
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for the investment project is thus given by (c + ) (1  u) = (rc    + ) (1  uz).
Notice that, since the rm can nance its investment with a mix of debt and eq-
uity, c is the real before-tax return required by the rm on a marginal investment
nanced through a mix of debt and equity, while rc = fci (1  u) + (1  fc) (Ec + )
denotes a weighted-average nominal discount rate, where fc is the share of investment
nanced by debt, i is the nominal interest rate on borrowing and Ec is the return on
investment nanced by retained earnings or new equity issues.2 In the special case
of investment entirely nanced by either equity or debt the discount rate reduces to
rce = (Ec + ) or rcd = i (1  u) and the user cost of capital is denoted by ce and
cd respectively.
Deferred taxation is introduced by noticing that US GAAP require the rm to
set capital provisions for the tax saving generated by the tax depreciation allowance.
The size of the provision equals the tax rate on the di¤erence between the value
of the capital stock for book and tax purposes. As a result, the cost of capital
increases in period t by u (  ), with  denoting the book depreciation rate.3 In
present value, the increase in the cost of capital determined by deferred taxation
in period t equals pt = u (z   z), where z denotes the present value of book
depreciation at the rate . Resources constrained in provisions for deferred taxes,
though undistributable to shareholders, can still be reinvested by the rm in the
nancial market.4 Consequently, the cost of capital reduces by the after-tax nominal
nancial return rc (1  u) pt. Combining these two elements, the before-tax real rate
2The net cost of investment under debt nace is i (1  u), since the cost of borrowing is deducte-
dible from the cost of capital.
3Recall that in period t the book value of capital is 1  while the tax value is 1  , hence the
temporary di¤erence is   .
4As noted earlier, reinvestment in physical capital is inconsistent with the logic underpinning the
original marginal investment choice of the rm, which implies that the rm has already reached the
optimal capital stock. A similar assumption can be found in Polito (2009) and Korinek and Stiglitz
(2009).
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of return required for a marginal investment, c , can be written as
c =
(rc    + )
(1  u) [1  uz   rc (1  u) pt]  ; (1)
where the star is now added to indicate that the computation is carried out under
the deferred tax constraint. The di¤erence between c and the after-tax real rate of
return savers expect to receive on the marginal savings provided to the rm denes
the tax wedge, while the ratio of the tax wedge to the before-tax rate of return is the
ETR. There are two typical specications of the ETR on income from capital when
investment is nanced with a mix of debt and equity. The rst considers taxation at
the corporate level only and it is given by
ETRc = 1 
r0c   
c
; (2)
where r0c  = fc (i  )+ (1  fc)Ec is the real after-tax rate of return paid by the
rm, being equal to i    on debt-nanced investments and Ec on equity-nanced
investments. The second specication adds taxation at the individual level, hence
resulting in the e¤ective total tax rate
ETTRc = 1 
sc
c
; (3)
where sc is the rate of return savers realize after payment of personal income taxes
when investment is nanced by a mix of debt and equity. The special cases of
the ETR at the corporate level on investment entirely nanced by either equity
(ETRce) or debt (ETR

cd) are obtained by replacing rce and rcd in (1) to obtain
the corresponding measures of ce and 

cd and then substituting these into (2). The
corresponding ETTRce and debt ETTR

cd are obtained after replacing 

ce and 

cd
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in (3), as well as the after-tax return received by individuals, which are denoted in
each case as sce and scd.5
4 Deferred taxation and corporate tax policy
Equations (2) and (3) show that the specication of the user cost of capital is crucial
in the determination of the ETR on income from capital: given the after-tax rate of
return, any tax policy that increases (reduces) the user cost of capital has the e¤ect
of increasing (reducing) the ETR. To clarify the implications of deferred taxation for
corporate tax policy analysis it is therefore convenient to compare the formulation
of the user cost of capital in (1) with those employed in the standard literature.
If the tax liability function does not account for deferred taxation, then pt = 0
and equation (1) reduces to the standard neoclassical formula for the user cost of
capital
c =
(rc    + )
(1  u) (1  uz)  ; (4)
where the star above c is now omitted to indicate that the computation abstracts
from the deferred tax constraint. The tax policy prescriptions implied by c are well
known. First, an increase in the tax depreciation rate reduces the before-tax real rate
return required for a marginal investment, in turn reducing the ETR. In particular,
the response of the user cost of capital to an increase of the present value of tax
depreciation is measured as
@c
@z
=  u (rc    + )
(1  u) < 0: (5)
5The actual specication of sc, sce and scd mainly depends on the form of investment nance,
how saving is taxed at the personal level and the type of account used by the individual shareholder
to receive payments from the rm. It is however independent from the specication of the deferred
tax constraint. For a full description of these, see either Burnham and Ozanne (2006) or CBO
(2006).
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Second, a corporate tax rate cut has an ambiguous e¤ect on the ETR since, on the one
hand, it increases the user cost of capital by reducing the tax saving generated by tax
depreciation but, on the other hand, it reduces the tax charge levied on the marginal
rate of return. Third, when tax depreciation equals economic depreciation, the ETR
implied by (4) corresponds to the statutory tax rate if investment is entirely nanced
by equity, ETRce = u, and becomes negative if investment is nanced entirely by
debt, ETRcd =  u= [i (1  u)  ]. Fourth, in the case of debt nancing, the
e¤ective total tax rate equals zero, ETTRcd = 0. Similarly, ETRcd equals zero when
tax depreciation equals economic depreciation and there is not ination.
Kanniainen and Söderstens (1995) formulation of the user cost of capital under
deferred taxation is obtained from equation (1) by assuming that book depreciation
reects economic depreciation and that nancial resources accumulated in provisions
for deferred taxes are not reinvested: rc (1  u) pt = 0. If book and economic de-
preciation evolve on a declining balance basis at the rate , then z = z = +rc 
and the user cost of capital on investment derived from Kanniainen and Södersten
(1995), KSc , becomes
KSc =
rc   
(1  u) ; (6)
which shows that changes in the tax depreciation rate have no e¤ect on the before-
tax real rate return required for a marginal investment, @
KS
ce
@z
= 0, and in turn on
the ETR. In particular, in the case of investment nanced by equity alone the ETR
becomes
ETRKSce = u; (7)
which shows that the e¤ective tax burden responds one-for-one to changes in the
statutory corporate income tax, regardless of the gap between economic and tax
depreciation. When investment is nanced by debt, the ETR at the corporate level
14
only becomes
ETRKScd =  u= [i (1  u)  ] ; (8)
while after including individual taxation is
ETTRKScd = 0; (9)
therefore conrming that corporate tax incentives granted in the form of either ac-
celerated depreciation or partial expensing are entirely ine¤ective in reducing the
tax burden on income from capital. Indeed, this is the same result obtained from
the standard model under the assumption that tax depreciation equals to economic
depreciation. Furthermore, the equations (7) - (9) show that there is no e¤ective tax
burden di¤erential on di¤erent asset types, since the ETR under this specication of
the deferred tax constraint is independent from the rate of return generated by each
asset and its rate of economic depreciation.
Polito (2009) retains the assumption that book depreciation equals economic de-
preciation, but allows rms to reinvest in the nancial market resources accumulated
in provisions for deferred taxes. This implies that equation (1) reduces to
Pc =
(rc    + )
(1  u) [1  uz   rc (1  u) pt]  ; (10)
with pt = u (z   z). Using (5) it therefore follows that
@Pc
@z
= rc (1  u) @c
@z
;
which shows that the omission of the deferred tax constraint has the e¤ect of oversta-
ting the benet from higher tax depreciation on the ETR. This result clearly holds
15
regardless of the form of investment nance.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Data and benchmark specication
The impact of the deferred tax constraint on the ETR in the United States is quan-
tied for the period 2000-2010 using the data for the computation of ETRs provided
by the CBO (2006) database.6 The original dataset includes 53 assets divided into
four categories: equipment (32 assets), structures (17), inventories (1) and land (3),
of a total value of 32,245 billions of US (2002) dollars; 56 per cent of which is part of
business investment. Table 1 summarizes the data used in this paper, which considers
only those assets that can benet from tax depreciation allowances, since only their
ETR is a¤ected by deferred taxation. This leaves 46 assets, distinguished between
equipment (32) and non-residential structures (14), of a total value of 10,318 billions
of dollars, thus covering 57 per cent of the value of business investment in the United
States. About 81 per cent of the income generated by these assets is subject to the
corporate income tax, while the remaining 19 per cent is subject to the individual
tax.
The calculation of the ETRs employs all the assumptions and numerical values
for the calibration of the models parameters used in CBO (2006) and summarized
in Burnham and Ozanne (2006). The empirical application compares measures of
the ETR obtained with (constrained model) and without (unconstrained model) the
deferred tax constraint. ETRs from the unconstrained model, i.e. based on the user
cost of capital in equation (4), are therefore consistent with those obtained by CBO
(2006). As noted above, the impact of the deferred tax constraint depends on the
6The excel spreadsheets with the data along with the companion paper describing the method-
ology and assumptions employed by CBO (2006) for computing the e¤ective tax rates is freely
available at www.cbo.gov.
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TABLE 1: ASSETSDISTRIBUTION BY TYPE AND FORM OF ORGANIZATION
Asset types (number of assets) Value of stock, $ billions
Corporate Non-corporate Total
Equipment (32) 3,456 731 4,187
Computers (2) 411 74 484
Communications (3) 606 93 699
O¢ ce (6) 223 88 311
Automobiles (1) 117 25 142
Other vehicles (5) 592 101 693
Machinery (8) 627 205 833
Industrial equipment (3) 414 64 479
Other equipment (5) 465 80 546
Structures (14) 4,903 1,228 6,131
Nonresidential (6) 2,914 919 3,834
Mining and drilling (2) 394 33 427
Other structures (6) 1,595 275 1,870
Total (46) 8,359 1,959 10,317
Memo:
Total Business Investment 18,010
Total Investment 32,245
Source: CBO (2006) and authors calculations
gap between book and tax depreciation and how rms use spare cash holdings at the
margin. The empirical analysis starts by setting a benchmark specication based on
the assumption that book depreciation coincides with economic depreciation and that
the liquidity generated by deferred taxation is reinvested in the nancial market at
the marginal rate. Thus, under the benchmark specication the ETRs are e¤ectively
based on the user cost of capital in equation (10). The assumption of book deprecia-
tion being equal to economic depreciation provides a plausible benchmark for at least
two reasons. First, it is consistent with the standard convention established in the
economic literature on tax depreciation and deferred taxation used for the derivation
of equation (6). Second, and most importantly, over the past 10 years, accounting
standards followed by corporations in the United States, and more generally in the
whole OECD area, have increased their exibility in order to align book depreciation
with economic depreciation. Indeed, the IAS 16 (International GAAP 2010) does not
prescribe any specic method and/or rate of depreciation for nancial reporting, as it
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requires the depreciation charge to reect the pattern of consumption of the benets
the assets brings over its useful life, which is essentially consistent with economic
depreciation. A qualitative and quantitative assessment of how di¤erences between
book and economic depreciation a¤ect the ETR is provided later in section 6.
Since under the benchmark specication the impact of the deferred tax constraint
on the ETR depends on the actual gap between tax and economic depreciation, Ta-
ble 2 documents the magnitude of this gap in the data. The rst column reports
weighted average rates of economic depreciation for each asset types, ,7 while the
rest of the table reports the ratios (weighted averages for each asset types) of the
present value of tax depreciation to the present value of economic depreciation: ra-
tios greater (lower) than 100 indicate that corporations can claim tax depreciation
allowances faster (slower) than the assets themselves depreciate, in turn implying that
they must also set capital provisions for deferred tax liabilities (assets). The table
distinguishes between three forms of investment nance (equity, debt and mix debt-
equity) and three depreciation regimes in place during the last decade: permanent
law, 30 and 50 per cent partial expensing. The ratios are generally greater than 100
under the permanent depreciation law, and further increase when partial expensing is
applied. This is essentially consistent with Poterba, Rao and Seidmans (2011) nd-
ing that the aggregate net deferred tax balance of the corporate sector in the United
States is a liability, and tax depreciation allowances are its main source. Ratios for
structures are in general higher than those for equipment as a result of high tax de-
preciation deductions allowed on investment in the energy industry. Assets with the
highest ratios are those classied under "Other structures", which comprise electric
power structures, other power structures, communication structures, railroads, farm
7CBO (2006) uses rates of economic depreciation published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
which are based on the work of Hulten and Wyco¤ (1981).
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structures and other nonresidential structures. This category however accounts for
about one-third of the overall value of structures and for about 20 per cent of the
overall value of the capital stock subject to the corporate income tax.
TABLE 2: RATIO BETWEEN TAX AND ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION
Asset types  Permanent law 30% expensing 50% expensing
Equity Debt Mix Equity Debt Mix Equity Debt Mix
Equipment 16.2 125 109 119 135 114 127 143 117 132
Computers 44.8 100 99 100 105 101 103 108 102 106
Communications 12.0 126 109 119 136 114 127 142 117 132
O¢ ce 13.8 124 108 118 133 112 125 139 115 129
Automobiles 33.3 102 99 101 108 102 105 111 104 108
Other vehicles 12.0 137 115 128 147 119 136 154 122 141
Machinery 12.6 126 110 120 135 114 127 142 117 132
Industrial equipment 10.4 133 112 125 143 117 133 150 120 138
Other equipment 8.8 126 109 120 150 120 138 166 126 150
Structures 2.9 141 117 134 158 123 145 169 127 153
Nonresidential 2.7 104 97 103 104 97 103 104 97 103
Mining and drilling 7.2 166 128 151 176 132 158 183 134 163
Other structures 2.2 212 155 193 264 174 230 299 186 255
Total 8.3 135 113 128 149 119 138 158 123 145
Notes: =Economic depreciation rates, weighted average for each asset type.
Source: CBO (2006) and authors calculations.
5.2 Taxation at the corporate level
The evolution of the ETR on business investment in the United States for the period
2000-2010 obtained under the benchmark specication of the model, when investment
is subject to taxation at the corporate level alone, is reported in Figure 1. As in CBO
(2006), the main parameters, in percentages, are calibrated as follows: the corporate
tax rate (u) is 35, ination () is 1.8, the nominal rate (i = r0cd) is 7.2, the return on
equity investment (Ec = r0ce   ) is 7, and the share of investment nanced by debt
(fc) is 41. Rates of economic depreciation and present values of tax depreciation on
di¤erent asset types were summarized in Table 2.
Since the top statutory corporate tax rate has been held constant at 35 per cent
over the last decade, changes in tax depreciation are the only factor determining
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variations of the ETR in the constrained and unconstrained models: as noted in the
introduction the permanent depreciation law is applied in the year 2000 and from
2005 to 2007, the 30 per cent partial expensing from 2001 to 2003, whereas the 50
per cent partial expensing is applied in 2004 and 2008-2009.
The ETRs in Figure 1 are weighted averages on investment in equipment (left
panels) and structures (right panels) when the source of nance is either equity
(top panels) or debt (bottom panel). In the case of equity nance, the ETR from
the constrained model on investment in both equipment and structures is positive
but close to the statutory tax rate and display little response to changes in tax
depreciation over the whole 2000-2010 period. In sharp contrast, the ETR from the
unconstrained model is still positive but well below the statutory tax rate. This
measure of the ETR falls in particular in the early and late 2000s, when the tax code
provided bonus depreciation.8
When investment is nanced by debt alone, the ETR computed from both models
is negative, as a result of the double incentive resulting from the deduction of interest
payments and high tax depreciation: the ETR measured from the constrained model
is relatively stable over time and just below -20 per cent, whereas the ETR obtained
from the unconstrained model is far lower and reduces considerably when rms can
claim bonus depreciation.
8The ETR on equipment is in general lower than that on structures because the user cost of
capital is computed net of the rate of economic depreciation, see equation (4), which is on average
greater for equipment than structures, see Table 2.
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Figure 1: ETRs on business investment in the United States, 2000-2010. Taxation
at the corporate level
Table 3 provides a numerical assessment of these results. The constrained model
(top panel) suggests that the ETR does not respond signicantly to changes in tax
depreciation, being on average equal to 34.5 per cent under equity nance, -22.3 per
cent on debt nanced investment, and about 22.5 per cent on investment nanced
through a debt-equity mix. In addition, it is evident that the ETR di¤erential across
asset types is almost negligible, and only marginally a¤ected by changes in the de-
preciation regime: the standard deviation of the ETR across assets is below 0.4 per
cent regardless of the form of investment nance and the depreciation regime. Note
that in the absence of reinvestment, the ETR from the constrained model is for all
assets equal to 35 per cent on investment nanced by equity, -21.87 on debt-nanced
investment and 22.35 when investment is nanced by the assumed debt-equity mix.9
9These are derived by replacing in equation (2) the user cost of capital obtained in (7) and (8).
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As these rates are valid irrespective of the type of asset, the ETR di¤erential is there-
fore zero in the absence of reinvestment. The unconstrained model (bottom panel)
instead predicts signicant declines of the ETR under partial expensing: on aver-
age across all type of assets and for investment nanced through a mix of debt and
equity, the ETR declines by about 4 per cent under the 30 per cent bonus deprecia-
tion and by a further 3 per cent under 50 per cent expensing. The decline is larger
for investment in equipment and under debt nance. The unconstrained model also
shows a signicant ETR di¤erential among di¤erent types of assets, which increases
under partial expensing: the standard deviation of the ETR across assets is 5.7,
12.6 and 7.1 per cent for investment nanced by equity, debt and mix debt-equity
respectively under the permanent depreciation law. This increases to 7.1, 13.9 and
8.5 respectively under 50 per cent partial expensing.
5.3 Taxation at the corporate and individual level
Corporations can pass the after-tax return on business investment to individual share-
holders either directly through payments of dividends and interests or indirectly by
reinvesting prots and generating capital gains. Dividends, interests and capital gains
are subject to the individual income tax when received by individual shareholders.
The impact of this further level of taxation in general depends on the statutory tax
rates levied under the individual income tax; the relief for the double taxation at
the corporate and individual level of capital income granted by the tax system; and
whether the dividend, interest or capital gain is supplied through either a nontaxable,
or a temporarily deferred or fully taxable account.10 Taxation at the individual level
10As in CBO (2006) the calibration assumes that interest income is supplied through accounts
that are fully taxable by 46 per cent, temporarily deferred by 21.3 per cent and nontaxable by 32.7
per cent. These percentages change to 58.4, 5.8 and 35.8 per cent respectively for equity income.
It is also assumed that 57.14 per cent of the real equity return is paid as dividend while the rest is
reinvested and paid as capital gain.
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TABLE 3: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, CORPORATE TAXATION ONLY
Asset types Permanent law 30% expensing 50% expensing
Equity Debt Mix Equity Debt Mix Equity Debt Mix
Constrained model
Equipment 34.5 -22.3 21.9 34.3 -22.5 21.6 34.1 -22.7 21.5
Computers 35.0 -21.6 22.4 34.6 -22.1 22.0 34.3 -22.4 21.7
Communications 34.4 -22.4 21.8 34.2 -22.6 21.6 34.1 -22.8 21.4
O¢ ce 34.4 -22.4 21.8 34.2 -22.6 21.6 34.1 -22.8 21.4
Automobiles 34.9 -21.7 22.3 34.5 -22.2 21.9 34.3 -22.4 21.7
Other vehicles 34.3 -22.5 21.7 34.1 -22.7 21.5 34.0 -22.8 21.4
Machinery 34.4 -22.4 21.8 34.2 -22.6 21.6 34.0 -22.8 21.4
Industrial equipment 34.4 -22.5 21.7 34.2 -22.7 21.5 34.0 -22.8 21.4
Other equipment 34.6 -22.2 22.0 34.4 -22.5 21.7 34.2 -22.7 21.5
Structures 34.8 -22.1 22.1 34.7 -22.1 22.1 34.7 -22.2 22.0
Nonresidential 35.0 -21.8 22.3 35.0 -21.8 22.3 35.0 -21.8 22.3
Mining and drilling 34.1 -22.8 21.5 34.0 -22.9 21.4 33.9 -23.0 21.3
Other structures 34.5 -22.4 21.9 34.3 -22.6 21.7 34.2 -22.7 21.5
Total 34.7 -22.2 22.0 34.5 -22.3 21.9 34.4 -22.4 21.8
Unconstrained model
Equipment 24.9 -37.0 10.4 18.9 -48.9 3.3 14.3 -58.1 -2.2
Computers 34.5 -13.3 23.1 26.9 -28.5 13.9 20.9 -41.1 6.5
Communications 23.3 -40.6 8.4 17.5 -52.0 1.5 13.2 -60.7 -3.7
O¢ ce 23.1 -40.5 8.3 17.4 -51.9 1.5 13.1 -60.6 -3.7
Automobiles 32.8 -17.0 20.9 25.5 -31.9 12.0 19.6 -44.1 4.8
Other vehicles 20.9 -46.1 5.4 15.7 -56.4 -0.8 11.7 -64.1 -5.5
Machinery 22.8 -41.5 7.8 17.1 -52.7 1.1 12.9 -61.2 -4.0
Industrial equipment 21.9 -44.2 6.6 16.4 -54.9 0.0 12.3 -63.0 -4.9
Other equipment 28.1 -32.2 14.1 21.5 -45.0 6.2 16.4 -55.1 0.1
Structures 30.6 -30.2 16.7 28.6 -33.6 14.4 27.2 -36.1 12.8
Nonresidential 34.7 -20.3 22.1 34.7 -20.3 22.1 34.7 -20.3 22.1
Mining and drilling 15.0 -60.0 -2.1 11.0 -67.3 -6.8 8.1 -72.6 -10.1
Other structures 25.6 -43.6 9.9 20.1 -53.1 3.6 15.9 -60.2 -1.2
Total 28.3 -33.0 14.2 24.7 -39.8 9.9 21.9 -45.0 6.7
Source: Authorscalculations
does not alter the impact of deferred taxation on the user cost of capital, but results
in a higher tax burden on the rate of return realized by savers. Indeed, under the
standard calibration of the model employed by CBO (2006) the after-tax returns re-
alized by savers used in equation (3) are (sce =) 6.26 for equity-nanced investment,
(scd =) 4.49 for debt-nanced investment and (sc =) 5.53 for investment nanced
with a debt-equity mix, which are lower than the real after-tax rates of return - r0ce,
r0cd and r
0
c - paid by the rm in the case of taxation at the corporate level only.
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The evolution of the ETRs on business investment after considering taxation at
the corporate and individual level is presented in Figure 2. The computation of the
ETRs takes into account that the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act reduced to 15 per cent the statutory tax rates on dividends and capital gains, and
maintains these lower rates until 2010. This has the e¤ect of increasing the after tax
return realized by individual savers under equity nance, thus resulting in sce =6.44
and sc =5.63.
Taxation at the individual level evidently increases the ETR regardless of the
type of investment asset and form of nance. The constrained model shows that
after including taxation at the individual level the ETR on equity nanced invest-
ment increases above the statutory corporate tax rate. This ETTR had a signicant
decline only in 2003 as a result of the reduced individual tax rates on dividend income
and capital gains, while remaining fairly stable in the other periods. This therefore
corroborates the previous nding that the e¤ective tax burden is essentially deter-
mined by changes in tax rates, rather than depreciation allowances. The ETTR on
debt nanced investment is instead close to zero throughout the whole 2000-2010 pe-
riod. As for the case of taxation at the corporate level alone, there are not signicant
di¤erences in the ETRs on equipment and structures.
These results are in sharp contrast with those obtained from the standard model,
which suggests that when investment is nanced by equity the ETTR on equipment is
still below the statutory corporate tax rate under the permanent depreciation law and
further decreases under partial expensing, whereas the ETTR on structures is lower
than the statutory corporate tax rate only under bonus depreciation. The standard
model also suggests that taxation at the individual level only partially o¤sets the
benet from high tax depreciation and the deduction of the cost of capital, since the
ETTR on debt nanced investment is still predicted to be well below zero. Visual
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inspection clearly shows that ETRs di¤erentials across asset types remains signicant
even after inclusion of taxation at the individual level.
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Figure 2: ETRs on business investment in the United States, 2000-2010. Taxation
at the corporate and individual level
Numerical values of the ETTRs under individual taxation before and after the
2003 reduced rates on dividend income and capital gains are summarized in Tables
4 and 5 respectively. Compared to the case of taxation at the corporate level alone,
the ETTRs increase in the constrained model from 34.7 to 41.6 per cent on equity
nance and from -22 to -1.5 per cent for debt nance, resulting in an average increase
across all type of assets under the mixed debt-equity nance of about 10 per cent,
regardless of the tax depreciation regime. The unconstrained model predicts increases
in the ETTR of about 8, 23 and 11 per cent for investment nanced by equity, debt
and debt-equity mix respectively. Both models suggest that the reduced rates on
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dividend income and capital gains introduced in 2003 resulted in a fall of the average
ETTR of about 2 and 1.5 per cent depending on whether investment is fully or
only partially nanced with equity. Most notably, introduction of taxation at the
individual level does not alter the previous nding that the ETR is far more stable
over time than predicted by the standard theory and that ETRs across di¤erent assets
are in practice negligible: the standard deviation of the ETTRs obtained from the
constrained model reported in both Tables 4 and 5 is never higher than 0.5 per cent,
regardless of the form of investment nance and the depreciation regime; whereas
for the unconstrained model it is 5.73, 11.78 and 7.02 per cent under the permanent
depreciation law when investment is nanced by equity, debt and the debt-equity mix
respectively, rising to 6.56, 12.05 and 7.73 per cent respectively under the 50 per cent
partial expensing. Finally note that, if computed in the absence of reinvestment,
the ETTRs from the constrained model would be equal to 41.91 per cent under
equity nance and 0 under debt nance for all assets. The ETTR on equity nanced
investment would fall to 40.2 after considering the 2003 rate reduction.
6 Book vs. economic depreciation
The benchmark specication of the empirical model for the computation of the ETRs
assumed that deferred taxation depended on the gap between economic and tax
depreciation. However, the deferred tax constraint under US GAAP is ultimately
determined by the di¤erence between book and tax depreciation, as disclosed in the
formulation of the user cost of capital in equation (1).
To illustrate how the interplay between tax, book and economic depreciation
a¤ects the ETR, it is convenient to re-write the user cost of capital in equation (1)
as
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TABLE 4: EFFECTIVE TOTAL TAX RATES ON BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL TAXATION BEFORE 2003
Asset types Permanent law 30% expensing 50% expensing
Equity Debt Mix Equity Debt Mix Equity Debt Mix
Constrained model
Equipment 41.5 -1.6 31.9 41.2 -1.9 31.7 41.1 -2.0 31.5
Computers 41.9 -1.1 32.3 41.5 -1.5 32.0 41.3 -1.7 31.8
Communications 41.4 -1.7 31.8 41.2 -1.9 31.6 41.1 -2.1 31.5
O¢ ce 41.4 -1.7 31.8 41.2 -1.9 31.6 41.1 -2.1 31.5
Automobiles 41.8 -1.2 32.2 41.5 -1.6 31.9 41.3 -1.8 31.7
Other vehicles 41.3 -1.8 31.7 41.1 -2.0 31.6 41.0 -2.1 31.5
Machinery 41.4 -1.7 31.8 41.2 -1.9 31.6 41.1 -2.1 31.5
Industrial equipment 41.3 -1.8 31.8 41.2 -2.0 31.6 41.0 -2.1 31.5
Other equipment 41.6 -1.6 32.0 41.3 -1.8 31.8 41.2 -2.0 31.6
Structures 41.7 -1.5 32.1 41.7 -1.5 32.0 41.6 -1.6 32.0
Nonresidential 41.9 -1.3 32.3 41.9 -1.3 32.3 41.9 -1.3 32.3
Mining and drilling 41.1 -2.1 31.5 41.0 -2.2 31.4 40.9 -2.2 31.4
Other structures 41.5 -1.8 31.9 41.3 -1.9 31.7 41.2 -2.0 31.6
Total 41.6 -1.5 32.0 41.5 -1.7 31.9 41.4 -1.8 31.8
Unconstrained model
Equipment 32.9 -13.9 21.9 27.5 -23.8 15.7 23.4 -31.4 10.9
Computers 41.4 5.8 32.9 34.7 -6.8 24.9 29.3 -17.3 18.4
Communications 31.4 -16.9 20.1 26.3 -26.4 14.1 22.4 -33.6 9.6
O¢ ce 31.3 -16.8 20.1 26.2 -26.3 14.1 22.3 -33.5 9.6
Automobiles 40.0 2.7 31.1 33.4 -9.7 23.3 28.2 -19.8 17.0
Other vehicles 29.3 -21.4 17.6 24.6 -30.0 12.1 21.1 -36.5 8.0
Machinery 31.0 -17.7 19.6 25.9 -27.0 13.7 22.1 -34.1 9.3
Industrial equipment 30.2 -19.9 18.5 25.3 -28.8 12.8 21.6 -35.5 8.6
Other equipment 35.8 -9.9 25.1 29.9 -20.6 18.2 25.3 -28.9 12.9
Structures 38.0 -8.2 27.4 36.2 -11.1 25.4 34.9 -13.2 23.9
Nonresidential 41.7 0.0 32.1 41.7 0.0 32.1 41.7 0.0 32.1
Mining and drilling 24.0 -33.0 11.0 20.5 -39.1 6.9 17.9 -43.5 4.0
Other structures 33.5 -19.4 21.4 28.6 -27.3 15.9 24.9 -33.2 11.8
Total 35.9 -10.6 25.2 32.7 -16.2 21.4 30.2 -20.6 18.6
Source: Authors calculations
c = c +(z   z) ;
where c is dened in (4) and  =
(rc +)
(1 u) [1  rc (1  u)] measures the bias in the
user cost of capital (ETR) caused by the omission of the deferred tax constraint. Since
 is always positive, it follows that c R c if  R . In other words, the deferred
tax constraint is always binding, unless tax depreciation equals book depreciation.
The rate of book depreciation in terms of the economic depreciation rate can be
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TABLE 5: EFFECTIVE TOTAL TAX RATES ON BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL TAXATION AFTER 2003
Asset types Permanent law 30% expensing 50% expensing
Equity Debt Mix Equity Debt Mix Equity Debt Mix
Constrained model
Equipment 39.7 -1.6 30.5 39.5 -1.9 30.3 39.4 -2.0 30.2
Computers 40.2 -1.1 31.0 39.8 -1.5 30.6 39.6 -1.7 30.4
Communications 39.7 -1.7 30.5 39.5 -1.9 30.3 39.3 -2.1 30.1
O¢ ce 39.7 -1.7 30.5 39.4 -1.9 30.3 39.3 -2.1 30.1
Automobiles 40.1 -1.2 30.9 39.7 -1.6 30.6 39.5 -1.8 30.4
Other vehicles 39.6 -1.8 30.4 39.4 -2.0 30.2 39.3 -2.1 30.1
Machinery 39.6 -1.7 30.5 39.4 -1.9 30.3 39.3 -2.1 30.1
Industrial equipment 39.6 -1.8 30.4 39.4 -2.0 30.2 39.3 -2.1 30.1
Other equipment 39.9 -1.6 30.7 39.6 -1.8 30.4 39.4 -2.0 30.2
Structures 40.0 -1.5 30.8 39.9 -1.5 30.7 39.9 -1.6 30.7
Nonresidential 40.2 -1.3 30.9 40.2 -1.3 30.9 40.2 -1.3 30.9
Mining and drilling 39.4 -2.1 30.2 39.2 -2.2 30.1 39.2 -2.2 30.0
Other structures 39.8 -1.8 30.5 39.6 -1.9 30.3 39.4 -2.0 30.2
Total 39.9 -1.5 30.7 39.8 -1.7 30.6 39.7 -1.8 30.5
Unconstrained model
Equipment 30.9 -13.9 20.4 25.3 -23.8 14.0 21.1 -31.4 9.1
Computers 39.7 5.8 31.6 32.8 -6.8 23.4 27.2 -17.3 16.8
Communications 29.4 -16.9 18.6 24.1 -26.4 12.4 20.1 -33.6 7.8
O¢ ce 29.3 -16.8 18.5 24.0 -26.3 12.4 20.0 -33.5 7.8
Automobiles 38.2 2.7 29.7 31.4 -9.7 21.8 26.0 -19.8 15.4
Other vehicles 27.2 -21.4 15.9 22.4 -30.0 10.3 18.8 -36.5 6.2
Machinery 28.9 -17.7 18.0 23.7 -27.0 12.0 19.8 -34.1 7.5
Industrial equipment 28.1 -19.9 16.9 23.1 -28.8 11.1 19.3 -35.5 6.8
Other equipment 33.9 -9.9 23.6 27.8 -20.6 16.6 23.1 -28.9 11.1
Structures 36.1 -8.2 25.9 34.3 -11.1 23.9 33.0 -13.2 22.4
Nonresidential 39.9 0.0 30.7 39.9 0.0 30.7 39.9 0.0 30.7
Mining and drilling 21.8 -33.0 9.2 18.1 -39.1 5.1 15.4 -43.5 2.1
Other structures 31.5 -19.4 19.9 26.5 -27.3 14.3 22.7 -33.2 10.0
Total 34.0 -10.6 23.7 30.7 -16.2 19.9 28.2 -20.6 17.0
Source: Authors calculations
written as  =  (1 + ), where  measures the di¤erence between book and economic
depreciation as a proportion of the economic depreciation rate: if  > (<)0, then
book depreciation is greater (lower) than economic depreciation. It then follows that
c = c +(z   z   z) ;
where z =

+rc  , which shows that unless z = z   z , i.e. book depreciation
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equals tax depreciation, the constraint is always binding. The actual e¤ect of the
constraint depends upon . If  < 0, then book depreciation is more conservative
relative to economic depreciation and the negative bias on the user cost of capital
increases. Vice-versa, if  > 0, then book depreciation is more aggressive than
economic depreciation, and the negative bias reduces.
This shows that a correct measurement of the ETR on income from capital re-
quires detailed information on methods and rates of assets depreciation for both
book and economic purposes, which is currently lacking for the assets used in table
1. In general, rates and methods of book depreciations are likely to di¤er across
industries and to change over long period of times. Basu (1997) and Givoly, Hayn,
and Natarajan (2007) suggest that they are also likely to change over the business cy-
cle, with accounting conservatism increasing ( > 0) during expansions and reducing
( < 0) during recessions.
Although the accounting literature has pointed out that accounting conservatism
may result in aggressive depreciation policies ( > 0), thus leading to an under-
statement of book prots, there is no systematic empirical evidence of accounting
conservatism across corporations in the United States. A recent study by Easton
and Pae (2004) concludes that "there is no evidence of conservatism associated with
over-depreciation" for the corporate sector in the United States. The authors re-
port a negative value of  for the aggregate corporate sector, but this is statistically
insignicant at the conventional level. When scrutinized across di¤erent industries,
the value of  is positive and statistically signicant for durable manufacturers, neg-
ative and statistically signicant for pharmaceutical, while no statistically signicant
 6= 0 is found in all other industries. Easton and Pae (2004) also nd evidence that
conservatism decreases during downturns, as the value of  becomes negative and
statistically signicant for rms with negative returns.
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This evidence suggests that equation (6) is likely to provide benchmark measures
of the ETR which accurately describe the evolution of the e¤ective tax burden in the
United States over the last 10 years. Nevertheless, the likely impact of the di¤erence
between book and economic depreciation on the ETR can be assessed through prior
predictive analysis.11 The assessment works as follows. Let i be an unknown
structural parameter denoting the rate of book depreciation of the asset i = 1; :::; T .
Dene ETRk (i) and ETTR

k (i) as the measures of the ETR on the asset i under
nance k = ce; cd and c, obtained from the model given a specic realization of
the parameter i = i. Assume that i is uniformly distributed over the interval
 = i (1 ), where i denotes the rate of economic depreciation of the assets i and
the parameter  measures the excess of book depreciation over economic depreciation.
Draw di from  for each i = 1; :::; T ; compute the ETR

k

di

and ETTRk

di

for
each draw d = 1; :::; D, for each i = 1; :::; T , and for each k = ce; cd,c; and order the
resulting ETRs increasingly. These can then be used to compute condence bands
for the ETRs at any specied condence level.
The ETRs on business investment taxed at both corporate and corporate-individual
levels, simulated for T = 49,  = 0:5, D = 10000 and at the 10 per cent condence
level, are presented in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. The simulation shows that al-
lowing book depreciation to di¤er from economic depreciation clearly adds a degree
of uncertainty on the actual measure of the ETR obtained from the constrained
model: the upper condence bands measure the ETR when book depreciation is
more conservative than economic depreciation ( < 0), whereas the lower condence
band occurs when book depreciation is more aggressive than economic depreciation
( > 0). The results show that the ETR from the constrained model is higher than
11Prior predictive analysis is widely employed for model evaluations in statistics, engineering and
economics. For a more detailed description see Canova (2007).
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that predicted from the unconstrained model and the di¤erence is statistically sig-
nicant, regardless of the category of investment asset (equipment or structures),
the form of investment nance (debt or equity) and whether the model accounts for
taxation at the individual level.
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Figure 3: ETRs on business investment in the United States with 90 per cent
condence bands (dotted lines), 2000-2010. Book depreciation di¤ers from
economic depreciation. Taxation at the corporate level
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Figure 4: ETRs on business investment with 90 per cent condence bands (dotted
lines) in the United States, 2000-2010. Book depreciation di¤ers from economic
depreciation. Taxation at the corporate and individual level
Table 6 summarises these results by reporting the average values of the ETRs on
business investment in the United States over the period 2000-2010 obtained from
the two models. Since partial expensing has little impact on the e¤ective tax burden
after accounting for the deferred tax constraint, ETRs have been essentially close to
headline statutory rates on equity nanced investment over the last decade. Debt
nancing has clearly the e¤ect of reducing the tax burden, but the investment sub-
sidy provided by the deduction of the cost of capital is far lower than that predicted
by the standard theory. Over the last decade, the average ETRs di¤erential across
asset types has been almost zero. Even after allowing for a systematic mismatch
between accounting and economic depreciation, which nds not support in the em-
pirical accounting literature, the ETR is signicantly higher than that predicted by
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the standard theory. The gap between the measures of the tax burden obtained from
the two models is likely to rise during periods of downturns or recession since on the
one hand partial expensing reduces the conventional measure of the ETR, and, on
the other hand, the constrained measure is likely to tend towards its upper bound.
TABLE 6: ETRs ON BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,
AVERAGE 2000-2010
Equity Debt Mix
Corporate taxation only
ETRce ETRce ETR

cd ETRcd ETR

c ETRc
Equipment 35 (42,29) 20 -21 (-2,-35) -46 22 (32,15) 5
Structures 35 (38,32) 29 -22 (-12,-30) -33 22 (27,18) 15
Total 35 (40,31) 26 -21 (-8,-32) -38 40 (47,35) 27
Corporate and individual taxation
ETTRce ETTRce ETTR

cd ETTRcd ETTR

c ETTRc
Equipment 40 (47,35) 27 -1 (15-12) -21 31 (40,24) 16
Structures 40 (43,38) 35 -1 (7-8) -10 31 (30,28) 24
Total 40 (44,36) 31 -1 (10-10) -15 31 (37,26) 21
Note: Upper and lower 90 per cent condence bands are reported in brackets.
Source: Authors calculations
7 Conclusion
This paper merges the traditional neoclassical literature on corporate taxation and
investment choices with the more recent literature on the impact of the deferred tax
constraint stemming from US GAAP on dividend policy and the cost of capital. The
theoretical importance of recognizing the deferred tax constraint for corporate tax
policy analysis has been outlined by several authors, for example, Sørensen (1995) and
more recently Mills (2006) and Plesko (2006) among others, and this paper e¤ectively
investigates the empirical relevance of these constraints by examining their e¤ect on
the corporate tax burden face by corporations in the United States.
The paper thus incorporates the dividend policy constraint stemming from the
deferred taxation generated by tax depreciation, as prescribed by the US GAAP, into
the CBO (2006) model for computing the ETRs. This new framework is then used
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to recalculate marginal ETRs on business investment in the United States over the
last 10 years.
The qualitative and quantitative analyses show that ETRs have been signicantly
higher than predicted by standard analysis over the last decade, and display little
response to tax base incentives such as immediate partial expensing of capital ex-
penditure. They also show that when corporations earnings are computed as under
US GAAP, ETRs di¤erentials for di¤erent types of assets are ultimately negligible.
The policy recommendation of this analysis is that changes in statutory tax rates
impact on the ETRs far more than temporary variations in the tax base (partial
expensing). This recommendation evidently applies within the framework of the
neoclassical investment model typically used for the computation of ETRs, which
evaluates investment choices at the margin and assumes that rms do not face liq-
uidity constraint. Within this framework, partial expensing generates extra liquidity
which rms do not require, and cannot be distributed to shareholders under US
GAAP.
The literature on the deferred tax constraint, typied by the works of King (1974),
Boadway and Bruce (1979), Sinn (1987) and Kanniainen and Södersten (1995), ar-
gues that the constraint is binding if rms nance investment by retained earnings
and distribute to shareholders any residual after-tax prot. This paper extends the
theoretical ndings of this literature, by showing that the impact of the deferred tax
constraint goes well beyond the way in which corporations nance investment and
distribute prots: the deferred tax constraint has a signicant impact on the ETR
when investment is nanced by retained earnings, new equity and debt; and cor-
porations distribute after-tax prots to individual shareholders through dividends,
capital gains or interests. Indeed the deferred tax constraint ultimately reclassies
the saving generated by tax depreciation, treated as a component of earnings in the
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standard literature, as being indebtedness towards the government. As explained by
King (1974), the deferred tax constraint is designed to protect the capital share in
the economy: corporations that pass to individual shareholders the saving generated
by tax depreciation are ultimately distributing capital, rather than earnings; and
the constraint is designed to prevent this from occurring under any nancial policy
undertaken by corporations.
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A Appendix 1: Deferred taxes and corporation earnings un-
der the temporary di¤erence approach
This appendix illustrates the basic principles of accounting for deferred taxes under
the temporary di¤erence approach using the example of a rm purchasing an asset
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worth $1000 which depreciates on a straight-line basis at the 20 per cent rate for
nancial reporting and on a straight-line basis at 25 per cent for tax purposes. As
shown in Table 6, in each year the di¤erence between the value of the asset for book
and tax accounting determines the temporary di¤erence, reported in the penultimate
column. The corresponding capital provision for deferred taxes is calculated in the
last column, as the product between the statutory tax rate (35 per cent) and the
temporary di¤erence: the value of the provision therefore increases in the rst four
years as tax depreciation exceeds book depreciation, whereas it reduces in the last
year since tax depreciations have been claimed in full but the rm still claims depre-
ciation for nancial reporting. In this example the rm sets a deferred tax liability
in the balance sheet to adjust for the fact that tax depreciation is deductible faster
than book depreciation. Hence the rm is postponing tax payments to the future.
In contrast, the rm would record a deferred tax asset in its balance sheet if tax
depreciation were deducted slower than book depreciation, to account for the earlier
tax charge.
TABLE 6: DEFERRED TAXES ACCOUNTING, BALANCE
SHEET
Year Depreciation Asset value Temporary Deferred Tax
Book Tax Book Tax Di¤erence provision
0 0 0 1000 1000 0 0
1 200 250 800 750 50 17.5
2 200 250 600 500 100 35
3 200 250 400 250 150 52.5
4 200 250 200 0 200 70
5 200 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Initial asset value is $1000; statutory tax rate is 35 per cent.
Source: Authors calculations
Table 7 illustrates how deferred taxes are charged on the income statement. It
is assumed that the book value of pre-tax earnings before depreciation is $300. The
deferred tax charge in each period corresponds to the change in the provision for
deferred taxes relative to the previous year (last column, Table 6): this is positive
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and increases the total tax liability in the rst four year, whereas it is negative and
reduces the total tax liability in the last year. The table therefore illustrates the e¤ect
of accounting for deferred taxation on corporate earnings: the after tax prot ($65)
equals the pre-tax earning ($300) minus book depreciation ($200) and the tax rate
on book prot (0.35100=35): In other words, corporation earnings available for
distribution to shareholders are una¤ected by the gap between book and tax income.
TABLE 7: DEFERRED TAXES ACCOUNTING, INCOME
STATEMENT
Year Pre-tax Depreciation Tax Current DTC Total After-tax
earning Book Tax base tax tax earning
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 300 200 250 50 17.5 17.5 35 65
2 300 200 250 50 17.5 17.5 35 65
3 300 200 250 50 17.5 17.5 35 65
4 300 200 250 50 17.5 17.5 35 65
5 300 200 0 300 105 -70 35 65
Note: Pre-tax earning is gross of book depreciation; DTC=Deferred tax
charge; statutory tax rate is 35 per cent.
Source: Authors calculations
Table 8 illustrates the after-tax earnings computation under deferred taxation
with re-investment. It is assumed that the rm invest the liquidity generated by
deferred taxation in a bank account earning a 10 per cent pre-tax rate of return and
this nancial return is part of corporate tax prots and taxed under the statutory tax
rate. After-tax earning therefore increases in the rst four periods in line with the
after-tax return from the nancial investment of resources in provision for deferred
taxes.
B Appendix 2: The model
The model considers a competitive rm, initially (t =  1) capitalized with k 1
dollars of equity, making investment expenditure in xed assets in period t = 0. The
change in the replacement cost of the capital base for economic, accounting and tax
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TABLE 8: DEFERRED TAXES ACCOUNTING WITH RE-INVESTMENT,
INCOME STATEMENT
Year Pre-tax Return TD Tax Current DTC Total After-tax
earning on DTC base tax tax earning
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 300 1.75 250 51.75 18.11 17.5 35.61 66.14
2 300 3.5 250 53.5 18.72 17.5 36.22 67.27
3 300 5.25 250 55.25 19.34 17.5 36.83 68.41
4 300 7 250 57 19.95 17.5 37.45 69.55
5 300 0 0 300 105 -70 35 65
Note: Pre-tax interest rate on provisions for deferred taxes is 10 per cent;
DTC=Deferred tax charge; TD=Tax depreciation; the tax rate is 35 per cent.
Source: Authors calculations
purposes are described respectively by
kt = xt + (1  ) kt 1 (11)
kt = xt + (1  ) kt 1 (12)
kt = xt + (1  ) kt 1 (13)
where xt is gross investment, kt is the stock of capital in period t, kt and k

t are
the values of the capital stock for book and tax purposes respectively,  is the rate
of physical depreciation,  is the rate of accounting depreciation and  the tax
depreciation rate. It is assumed that k 1 = k 1 = k

 1.
Deferred taxes measure future tax liabilities (if positive) or assets (if negative)
resulting from the di¤erence between the carrying amount of assets or liabilities
recognized in the balance sheet and their corresponding amount attributed for tax
purposes (temporary di¤erence). Under US GAAP, this implies that the rm must
set a provision Pt for any deferred tax assets and liability arising in period t. The
provision is equal to the tax rate on the di¤erence between the accounting and the
tax value of the capital stock. In other words, the value of provisions for deferred
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taxes accumulated up to period t is given by
Pt = u

kat   kt

; (14)
while the present value of provisions for deferred taxes per unit of investment
pt = u (z   z) ; (15)
where zs = s1+rc 
P1
j=0

1 s
1+rc 
j
= ss+rc  ; with s = ;  denoting present values
of depreciation allowances for book (s = ) and tax (s = ) purposes implied by
equations (12) and (13), rc is the nominal discount rate and  is the ination rate.
Notice how pt R 0 if  R .
Provisions for deferred taxes give rise to extra nancial resources which - in equi-
librium - can be invested in the nancial market at the nominal rate. Therefore, the
prot function of the rm in any period t is written as
t = f (kt 1)  rcbt 1 + rcPt 1; (16)
where f (kt 1) is a standard neoclassical production function with constant return
to scale in both factors and: f (0; 0) = 0, fk > 0, fkk < 0, fn > 0, fnn < 0.
The rms total tax liability, uTt , is given by the sum of current, u
C
t , and deferred,
uDt ; tax liabilities. Current tax liabilities are in general written as
uCt = u [f (kt 1)  rcbt 1 + rcPt 1   xt] : (17)
Deferred tax liabilities in any period t correspond to the change in the value of
provisions for deferred tax over the same period of time, equivalent to the tax rate
41
on the di¤erence between tax and accounting depreciation
uDt = Pt = u

kt   akat

: (18)
Notice that uDt > 0 measures a deferred tax liability, whereas u
D
t < 0 measures a
deferred tax asset: the former increases the stock of provisions for deferred taxes, the
latter reduce it.
Divided income distributable to shareholders is computed from the accounting
identity between sources and uses of income
t +bt = dt + u
T
t + xt: (19)
The left hand side includes retained prots or change in the stock of debt, whereas
the right hand side includes dividend payments (dt), taxes and new investment.
Subject to the constraints from (11) to (19), and the starting values of k 1,
b 1 and Pt 1, the rm maximizes the expected present value of dividend income
distributable to shareholders
V0 = E0
1X
t=0

1
1 + rc   
t
dt; (20)
where E0 denotes mathematical expectations. The rst order condition with respect
to the stock of capital yields the before-tax real rate return required for a marginal
investment in equation (1).
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